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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Ronald C. Elliott, appeals from 
the affirmation by the Honorable Judge Maurice Harding in 
the Fourth District Court for Utah County, of two orders 
given by respondent revoking appellant's driver's license 
pursuant to Utah's Implied Consent law, Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-44.10 (1953), as amended (hereinafter all references 
to Utah Code Ann. or U.C.A. are to the Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), as amended). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The two orders of revocation dated October 28, 
1975, in this case, were consolidated for trial since 
they were both similar in facts. The revocations were for 
the failure of appellant to take a sobriety test as 
provided under Utah's Implied Consent law. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44.10. 
The District Court with the Honorable Maurice 
Harding presiding upheld the revocation and found that 
appellant refused to submit to a chemical test as required 
in the statute and as provided by the officer. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the judgment of the Fourth 
Judicial District in and for Utah County should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent agrees with the facts as set forth 
in the appellant's brief with the following additions and/or 
corrections. (Note that the references in this brief are 
made to the original record of transcript as counsel for 
the appellant in stating his facts has provided no references 
to the record anywhere in his brief.) 
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First, counsel for the appellant stipulated that 
there was probable cause for the officers to arrest the 
appellant in the first incident for driving under the 
influence (R.7). This stipulation occurred just as 
officer Durrant was about to describe appellant's attempt 
at taking the field sobriety tests. 
Second, officer Durrant informed the appellant 
that the blood test was not available "after the implied 
consent law was read and before his reply" (R.12). 
Third, as pointed out on page three of appellant's 
brieff the appellant was at the intersection in the second 
incident which occurred less than four hours after the 
first. The appellant's car lights were one, the engine 
was running, and the radio was on. Officer Storrs testified 
that he had to "yell at him approximately four time before 
he even Looked up. at us, and he . . . we-asked him to shut 
his engine off and he reached over to put it in gear, and 
officer Burnham reached in and pushed it back into park so 
he couldn't drive off." (R.17). Officer Storrs finally 
turned the car off (R.18). Later, at the police station, 
officer Storrs administered some field tests to the appel-
lant. Officer Storrs testified, "His balance was real 
poor" (R.18). 
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Finally, appellant's counsel stated on page three 
of his brief that appellant "could not contact a lawyer." 
There is no showing from the record that appellant made 
an effort to call a lawyer. He did not request one. He 
did not ask that one be present. The record shows only 
that he made some calls (R.21). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1." Whether or not the arresting officer complied 
with the statutory requirements concerning the advice of 
rights under Utah's implied consent law. 
2. Whether or not the appellant refused a 
reasonable and proper request to submit to a chemical 
sobriety test, thereby making the revocation order proper. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ARRESTING OFFICER FULLY COMPLIED WITH THE 
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS WHEN INFORMING APPELLANT OF HIS 
RIGHTS UNDER UTAH'S IMPLIED CONSENT LAW. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 provides for revocation 
of a driver's license for refusal to submit to a sobriety 
test. The applicable statutory provisions are: 
"(a) Any person operating a 
motor vehicle in this state shall 
be deemed to have given his consent 
to a chemical test of his breath or 
blood for the purpose of determining 
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the alcoholic content of his blood, 
provided that such test is administered 
at the direction of a peace officer 
having reasonable grounds to believe 
such person to have been driving in an 
intoxicated condition. The arresting 
officer shall determine within reason 
which of the aforesaid tests shall be 
administered. 
* * * 
(c) If such person has been placed 
under arrest and has thereafter been 
requested to submit to any one of the 
chemical tests provided for in subsection 
(a) or (b) of this section and refuses to 
submit to such chemical test, the test 
shall not be given and the arresting officer 
shall advise the person of his rights under 
this section. Within twenty days after 
receiving an affidavit from the arresting 
officer to the effect that such person has 
refused a chemical test the department 
shall notify such person of a hearing before 
the department. If at said hearing the 
department determines that the person was 
granted the right to submit and without 
reasonable cause refused to submit to such 
test, or if such person fails to appear 
before the department as required in the 
notice, the department shall revoke for one 
year his license or permit to drive. Any 
person whose license has been revoked by 
the department under the provisions of 
this section shall have the right to file 
a petition within thirty days thereafter for 
a hearing in the matter in the District 
court in the county in which such person 
shall reside. Such court is hereby vested 
with jurisdiction, and it shall be its duty 
to set the matter for trial de novo upon ten 
days' written notice to the department and 
thereupon to take testimony and examine into 
the facts of the case and to determine whether 
the petitioner's license is subject to revoca-
tion under the provisions of this act." 
_ c ; _ 
Appellant's counsel relies on Gassman vr Dorius, 
543 P.2d 197 (1975), for the position that a person's 
"implied consent rights" must be given to him after his 
refusal. Other jurisdictions have decided contra on 
this point. State v. Twiss, 192 Neb. 402, 222 N.W.2d 
108 (1974); State v. Hill, 221 S.E.2d 398 (1976). 
Also, the fact situation in Gassman, supra, 
differed greatly from the case in chief. In Gassman, after 
the officer read Gassman his rights, both the officer and 
Gassman chose the blood test. They both agreed that the 
blood test be administered. It was chosen contemporaneously 
with the reading of the rights. No explanation of the 
breathazlyzer was given. One and one half hours later when 
Gassman's physician could not be reached the officer requested 
the breath. There was no reading of his rights with this 
request for the breath. Gassman assumed he could still take 
the blood test when the technicians arrived. In the instant 
case, only the breathalyzer was offered the appellant. It 
was offered immediately upon and contemporaneous with the 
recitation of appellant's implied consent rights. It is 
evident that appellant understood his rights since they 
were read to him again during the second incident by Officer 
Storrs who had been a witness when the rights were read to 
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the appellant in the first, incident. In fact, after the 
rights were read to the appellant in the second incident, 
he said, "we have already gone through this before" (R-20) . 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT REFUSED A REASONABLE AND PROPER 
REQUEST TO SUBMIT TO A CHEMICAL SOBRIETY TEST THEREBY MAKING 
THE REVOCATION ORDER PROPER. 
The 1967 amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(a) 
included inter alia: "The arresting officer shall determine 
within reason which of the tests shall be administered." This • 
was inserted explicitly to contravene the effects of Ringwood 
v. State, 8 Utah 2d 287, 333 P.2d 943 (1959); and Bean v. 
State, 12 Utah 2d 76, 362 P.2d 750 (1961), which gave the 
choice to the driver. 
It was entirely reasonable for the officers in the 
case in chief to request a breath test only. Wayne R. McTague, 
administrator for the American Fork Hospital, testified that 
American Fork Hospital was not drawing blood for chemical 
tests during the time in question. This fact was explained 
to appellant before he requested a blood test. The breath 
test was the only test available. The American Fork Police 
would be out of their jurisdiction in going to Provo, and it 
would have been unreasonable for them to leave their post to 
do so. 
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It has been construed in many jurisdictions that 
the purpose of a choice of tests is to select one that is 
reasonably available. The North Dakota statute, N.D.C.C. 
§ 39-20-01 contains almost identical language as Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44.10(a) with regards to giving the officer the 
determination of which test should be administered. In 
Clairmont v. Hjelle, 234 N.W.2d 13, at 15 (1975), the 
Supreme Court of North Dakota declared that the purpose of 
the statutory provision that the arresting officer shall 
determine which test for intoxication shall be used is 
"to permit the use of whichever test is readily available at 
the time (often late at night) and place (often rural areas) 
where the arrest is made." Even in jurisdictions where there 
is no specific choice given to the driver or the officer as 
which test should be used, the key in the selection of the 
test is that it be one that is "reasonably available." State 
v. Mastaler, 130 Vt. 44, 285 A.2d 776 (1971). In the 
instant case, the officer's request for appellant to take 
the breath test was entirely reasonable as it was the only 
available test. 
In addition, appellant requested the blood test only 
after the officers informed him that it was not available. 
Even in states where the motorist has the choice as in Maine, 
the state may suspend a person's license who requests a test 
not available and refuses to take any other available test. 
Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d 643 (Me- 1969). 
Appellant seems to imply that the officers 
had a duty to provide him with a blood test if he so 
requested. This view is plainly not supported by the 
statute. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (g) provides: 
"The person tested shall be 
permitted to have a physician of 
his own choosing administer a 
chemical test in addition to the 
one administered at the direction 
of the peace officer." (Emphasis 
added.) 
This opportunity was given appellant on several 
occasions but he did not avail himself of the opportunity. 
The statute puts no duty on the arresting officers or the 
state to procure a physician for the driver. Furthermore, 
as pointed out in Smith v. State, Registrar of Motor 
Vehicles, 40 Ohio App.2d 208, 69 Ohio Ops.2d 195, 318 
N.E.2d 431 (1974) (a case strikingly similar to the case in 
chief), the right of a motorist to have a person of his 
own choosing administer chemical tests for blood alcohol 
level in addition to the test administered at the direction 
of an officer is a statutory and not a constitutional 
right; thus, a refusal to allow a motorist to go to the 
hospital to obtain a blood test after he had refused to 
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take a breathalyzer test offered by an officer did not 
preclude the suspension of the operator's driver's license. 
There is no showing in the case in chief that 
appellant ever got in touch with a doctor, and he made no 
request for the officers to wait for a doctor. In fact, 
as admitted by the appellant, he never even tried to call 
his doctor (R.40,41). 
In Peterson v. Dorius, No. 13981 (Utah Supreme 
Court, March 19, 1976), relied on by the appellant, this 
Court pointed out "there might be reasonable causes to refuse 
to submit to a chemical test. . . . " There is no showing 
that appellant's refusal was reasonable. In fact, the test 
requested by the officers was the only reasonable one under 
the circumstances, and appellant's refusal to submit to it 
was belligerent and unreasonable. The reasonable cause 
for refusal in Peterson, supra, was that she wanted to 
wait for her lawyer. 
Counsel for appellant further misconstrues 
Gassman, supra. On page 7 of his brief, the reference by 
this Court that the breath test may well be thrown out was 
mere conjecture, obviously given as dicta by this Court. 
The breath test is fully authorized by statute and case 
law in this state. The plaintiff in Gassman, supra, did 
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not challenge the validity of the test generally. In fact, 
as pointed out at 543 P.2d, at 198: "He actually did not 
refuse even the breath test. . . . " He just refused to take 
it from the officers for the reason that he did not feel 
they would be impartial. The appellant in the instant case 
gave no reason to the officers for refusing the test except 
to refer to it as an expletive deleted. His reasons in 
fact for refusing the breath test were that the officers had 
informed him that it was the only test available, and they 
could not offer him the blood test. 
In addition, appellant's interpretation of 
Gibbs v. Dorius, 533 P.2d 299 (Utah 1975), is entirely out 
context. That case dealt solely with the qualifications of 
the person administering the blood test when that particular 
test is used. It sheds no light on the determination of which 
test should be used in a given circumstance. The quotation 
from Gibbs on page 7 of appellant's brief beginning "there 
are situations, . . ."is obviously intended by this Court 
to be only hypothetical in nature and not an insistence on 
the blood test in any particular instance. 
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POINT III 
THE LANGUAGE OF GASSMAN V, DORIUS SHOULD BE 
RE-EXAMINED BY THE COURT TO RESOLVE AN APPARENT CONFLICT 
WITH UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10(c) (1953), AS AMENDED, 
WITH REFERENCE TO THE DUTY APPELLANT SEEKS TO IMPOSE ON 
THE ARRESTING OFFICER IN ADVISING APPELLANT OF HIS RIGHTS 
UNDER THE AFORESAID SECTION. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (c) (1953) , as amended, 
contains directions to an arresting officer in the event 
that a person arrested for driving under the influence 
refuses to submit to a chemical test of his breath or 
blood, in the following language: 
"If such person has been placed 
under arrest and has thereafter been 
requested to submit to any one of the 
chemical tests provided for in 
subsections (a) or (b) of this section, 
and refuses to submit to such chemical 
test, the test shall not be given and 
the arresting officer shall advise 
the person of his rights under this 
section." (Emphasis supplied.) 
In Gassman v. Dorius, 543 P.2d 197 (Utah 1975) 
(as noted in Appellants brief at page 6), this Court 
indicated that the statute required an arresting officer 
to read one's rights under the Implied Consent Law after 
the refusal to take the test. This ruling, at least 
insofar as it may require a "reading" of one's rights, 
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is in direct conflict with the statute which, as noted 
above, only requires that the arresting officer "advise" 
a person charged with driving under the influence of his 
rights under the Implied Consent law. 
The word "advise" is defined as "to give advice 
to; to recommend (a course of action) to; to counsel; 
warn. To give information to; to apprise; inform." 
Webster's Unabridged Dictionary. Ballentine's Law 
Dictionary, Third Edition (1969), says that "advise" 
means "to give advice; to offer an opinion as worthy or 
expedient to be followed; to counsel." 
A review of the word "advise" in Words and 
Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 2A, indicates the 
following court constructions: 
". . .'advise' means to give 
advice; to counsel; it is different 
in meaning from 'instruct' or 'persuade'•" 
Hughes v. Van Bruggen, 44 N.M. 534, 105 
P.2d 494 (1940) . 
"In an instruction that all persons 
concerned in the commission of a crime, 
whether they directly committed the act 
constituting the offense, or aided or 
abetted in its commission, or even if 
not present at its commission, have 
advised or encouraged its commission, 
or principles in the crime so committed, 
the word 'advise' means fto give-counsel; 
to offer an opinion to as worthy or 
expedient to be followed; to recommend 
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as wise and prudent; or to suggest 
as the course of action1 and the 
term 'encourage• means 'to give 
courage to; to excite to action or 
perserverance1." State v. Allen, 
34 Mont. 403, 87 Pac. 177. 
In Hunter v. Adams, 4 Cal.Rptr. 776, 781, 180 
C.A.2d 511, the Court said that advise means to warn, to 
give notification or notice to, to apprise, to inform. 
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully 
suggested that in the instant case the individual was 
given advice and was advised of his rights contemporaneously 
with his refusal to take the chemical test and therefore 
the statute was followed. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that to the extent 
that Gassman v. Dorius, op. cit., purports to require a 
literal reading of the Implied Consent law to one who 
refuses to submit to a chemical test as opposed to 
advising one of one's rights under the act, it should 
be overruled. Great confusion has already resulted in 
the courts of this State in considering implied consent 
refusal trials de novo under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(c) 
(1953), as amended, as such lower courts have sought and 
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often applied this part of the Gassman decision literally 
and even in cases where it was shown that the officer had 
informed and advised a person as to the affect of the 
refusal, the courts have refused to uphold the suspension 
of a driver license by the defendant-respondent on the 
grounds that Gassman requires a reading of rights 
rather than the advice spoken of in the statute. Such 
a revision of the Gassman decision is necessary to 
eliminate the conflict between the statutory language 
and that decision. 
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CONCLUSION 
McCall v. Dorius, 527 P.2d 647 (Utah 1974}, and 
Peterson, supra, do point out what this Court has stated 
many times—that findings of the trial court, supported 
by substantial competent evidence, will not be disturbed 
on appeal. 
As pointed out in this brief, it is not the 
officer's duty to obtain the additional blood test requested 
by the appellant besides the test the officers requested 
him to take. The officers offered him the only reasonable 
test under the circumstances. The officers clearly 
reiterated to the appellant his rights on separate occasions. 
The officers in short fully administered the requirements
 { 
of the statute. 
The appellant was patently unreasonable in 
refusing the breath test in light of his knowledge that it
 ( 
was the only one available. He gave no reason at the time 
he was arrested for refusing the breath test. Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44.10 is aimed specifically at the problem of
 { 
the recalcitrant inebriate who refuses to take a sobriety 
test. The conduct of the appellant during the time in 
question comes squarely within the purview of this statute. < 
He was picked up two times in less than four hours. Three 
different police officers testified of his inebriated 
condition giving them probable cause to make an arrest. { 
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During the second incident the appellant was at the inter-
section slumped over the wheel with the lights on, the motor 
running, and the radio playing. Officer Storrs had to 
shout at him four times to get his attention. Yet, the 
appellant was unable to give any explanation other than 
drinking for his behavior. 
The lower court correctly upheld the statute in 
affirming the revocation. Appellantfs appeal should 
therefore be denied, and the order affirming appellant's 
driver's license revocation should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
HARRY E. McCOY, II 
Assistant Attorney General 
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